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Abstract:Researchers have extensively studied how large firms and SMEs use busi-
ness and political ties to obtain tangible and intangible resources in transition
economies. However, how SMEs establish these ties in the context of power-imbal-
anced dependence by using unethical and illegal “strategic practice” such as
bribery remains underexplored. Furthermore, how SMEs deploy strategies to mit-
igate such risky actions in the process of resource acquisition is also given limited
attention in the literature. Lack of exploration of these issues leaves significant gaps
in our understanding of how SMEs are able to initiate and operate their ties for sur-
vival and growth despite enormous institutional constraints. We analyze the neg-
ative and positive effects of power dependence on business resource acquisition
via regression analysis using survey data drawn from 232 Chinese SMEs. The find-
ings indicate that power-imbalanced dependence among SMEs is associated with
their use of bribery to establish political ties with officials for access to resources.
The moderating effect of power-mutual dependence on this relationship is also
examined. Theoretical significance and managerial implications of these findings
for SMEs in transition economies are discussed.
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power-mutual dependence, SMEs, transition economies
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Introduction
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are a fundamental part of the economic
fabric of transition economies and play a crucial role in the growth and prosperity
of nations. Resource acquisition is vital to the survival and growth of these firms.1
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1 Martens et al. (2007); Wang et al. (2013).
Business and Politics. 2017: Page 1 of 29
© V.K. Aggarwal 2017 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2017.31
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Access paid by the UC Berkeley Library, on 31 Oct 2017 at 22:17:50, subject to the
In unfavourable institutional environments, however, it is difficult for SMEs to
access critical resources.2 This is especially the case in economies such as
China, Russia, and Vietnam, given the existence of a substantial and privileged
state capitalist sector in which the government gives priority in resource acquisi-
tion to the large, state-owned enterprises.3 In such environments, SMEs can find
themselves in a power-imbalanced dependency in which one party controls the
resources—financial, legal, administrative, political, or production—that another
party values but does not have. The latter party is unilaterally dependent on the
former for access to those valued resources.4
Researchers have extensively studied how large firms and SMEs use business
and political ties to obtain tangible and intangible resources in transition econo-
mies that are experiencing significant institutional changes from central planning
tomarket competition.5 However, how SMEs establish these ties in a power-imbal-
anced dependency by using unethical and illegal “strategic practice” such as
bribery, with the possibility of considerable financial loss and legal penalty if
such action is uncovered, remains underexplored. Furthermore, how SMEs
deploy strategies to mitigate such risky actions in the process of resource acquisi-
tion is also given limited attention in the literature. Lack of exploration of these
issues leaves significant gaps in our understanding of how SMEs are able to initiate
and operate their ties for survival and growth despite enormous institutional
constraints.
To address these gaps, we analyse how SMEs in transition economies “culti-
vate” network environments characterized by political and business ties to facili-
tate resource acquisition in the face of institutional uncertainty and political
discrimination. Specifically, we develop a conceptual framework and empirically
determine (1) the extent to which the power-imbalanced dependence (PID) of
SMEs leads to a strategy of induced bribery in exchange for political ties; (2)
how this induced bribery is associated with an acquisition of business resources;
and (3) the extent to which dependence on induced bribery for resource acquisi-
tion is mitigated by SMEs’ power-mutual dependence (PMD) on business ties.
We analyse the negative and positive effects of PID on business resource
acquisition via regression analysis, using data from 232 Chinese SMEs. The
results suggest that SMEs’ PID on governments is positively associated with the
use of induced bribery to establish political ties with officials for access to resources
2 Guillen (2000); Peng et al. (2008); Puffer et al. (2009).
3 Zhou (2013).
4 Lawler and Yoon (1996); Casciaro and Piskorski (2005).
5 See, for example, Peng and Luo (2000); Li and Zhang (2007); Yiu and Lau (2008); Wang et al.
(2013); de Jong et al. (2012); Peng and Zhou (2005).
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in a transition economy, and that SMEs’ PMD through business ties minimizes this
relationship.
Our study contributes insights into SME resource acquisition in transition
economies by addressing two research aspects in the literature on SMEs. First,
we seek to extend resource dependence theory (RDT), which offers a comprehen-
sive account of how organizations seek to manage their reliance on external
environments,6 to understanding of SMEs’ business operations in transition econ-
omies by identifying the institutional prerequisites for their engagement in power
balancing for firm survival and growth. Disadvantages of PID can drive SMEs to
engage in the unethical bribery of officials. Previous research explaining
induced bribery in the context of inadequate formal institutions has not accounted
for the deliberate agency of actors.7 We depart from the narrow focus of this
literature by considering how SME entrepreneurs in transition economies use
unethical means to acquire critical business resources.
Second, we address underexplored aspects of how SMEs in transition econo-
mies act to mitigate power dependence on political ties in an effort to acquire
resources. In doing so, we explore the moderating effects of PMD in business
ties. As one of the few studies that explicitly examine the consequences of SMEs
using bribery in such a context, our research provides additional insights into
the issue of power balance in the SME literature of transition economies.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we elaborate on the
theoretical arguments and develop testable hypotheses. We then provide descrip-
tions of the data, variables, methods, and findings. Finally, we conclude with a dis-
cussion of the implications for firms.
Dependence, power imbalance, and exchange
Power-imbalanced dependence and resource acquisition
According to RTD, organizations must manage their dependencies on external
entities and limit these external dependencies when resources are considered crit-
ical. The practical reason is that they need to control critical resources either
to create value for competitive advantage in hyper-adversarial environments or
to survive in disadvantageous environments.8 RTD applies a dyadic approach to
resource dependence, defining two distinct but related aspects of power in a
6 Hillman et al. (2009); Pfeffer and Salancik (2003).
7 Calderón et al. (2009); Puffer et al. (2009); Huang and Rice (2012).
8 Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).
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dyad: power imbalance andmutual dependency.9 Power is an essential property of
social relations and is seen as a result of the simultaneous interaction of the power
capability of one party with that of another in RDT.10 Power imbalance is defined as
the difference between the two parties’ dependencies or as the ratio of the power of
the more powerful party to that of the less powerful party.11 The mutual depen-
dence aspect of dyadic power captures the existence of bilateral dependencies
in the dyad12 and is the sum of the equal power of a party’s dependence on
another in the long term.
Resource acquisition for SMEs in transition economies is constrained by two
types of firm dependence: First, where there is one party that depends on a dom-
inant party for resources important to its survival, there will be a PID. Such imbal-
ance can result when an external authority, such as government, has extensive
political control over the supply of critical resources. Second, where there are bilat-
eral dependencies between business parties with equal status in resource
exchange in the long term, there will be PMD.13
Most resource-dependency research has been conducted in developed coun-
tries where the external authority of government power is relatively transparent
and well defined through formal institutions of regulation, taxation, and so on.
In these contexts, political ties may be considered to be countervailing risks
leading to resource exclusion in democratic politics,14 while in transition econo-
mies such as China, Russia, and Vietnam, political ties are essential for a firm’s per-
formance in uncertain and dangerous political environments, as previous studies
suggest. Political ties are firms’ informal social connections with government offi-
cials at various levels of administration, including central and local governments,
and in regulatory agencies such as tax or stock market administrative bureaus.15
SMEs use networking and personal interactions to build purposeful political and
business ties with business players and government officials to minimize imbal-
ance dependency and resource exclusion16 and thereby create a favorable,
highly specific institutional environment. However, these political ties are built
upon firms’ unilateral dependencies on the political actors who confer benefits
on the firms.17
9 Casciaro and Piskorski (2005).
10 Emerson (1962); Casciaro and Piskorski (2005).
11 Lawler and Yoon (1996); Casciaro and Piskorski (2005).
12 Casciaro and Piskorski (2005).
13 Ibid.
14 Labianca and Brass (2006).
15 Wang et al. (2013); Zhou (2013).
16 Wang et al. (2013).
17 de Jong et al. (2012); Peng and Zhou (2005); Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012).
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The institutional environment comprises a set of fundamental political, social,
and legal ground rules that significantly shape a firm’s economic dependencies on
other entities.18 Institutional environments of transition economies are character-
ized not only by a lack of formal institutions but also by the administration of offi-
cials who control key resources and thus become politically as well as economically
important.19 Economic power is largely a matter of regulation rather than compet-
itive markets, and officials have considerable discretionary power over SMEs’
access to vital resources. In China, for example, government policies toward
private SMEs have evolved through a number of stages of strict prohibition, toler-
ance, accommodation, and limited encouragement.20 However, in terms of access
to critical resources and legal protection, there are still significant controls and lim-
itations on the operation of SMEs. Political discrimination still persists in favour of
large, state-owned enterprises.21 Such institutional environments afford opportu-
nities for substantial power imbalances to develop between officials and SME
entrepreneurs. These power imbalances can create high dependencies for SMEs
on external environments as they have only a limited capability to obtain critical
resources. Firms that seek to acquire essential resources find that themost efficient
way to gain these resources is by entering into power-imbalanced and dependent
relationships with officials.22
RDT posits that in a relationship characterized by power imbalance, the
dependent party will be expected to provide unilateral and valuable commitments
before tangible benefits can flow from the dominant side.23 In such a relationship,
rational SMEs need to proactively influence their environment tominimize or neu-
tralize imbalance dependence for the acquisition of critical resources.24 One
mechanism is to develop a “bridge” between businesses and external parties to
facilitate beneficial exchanges and establish political ties. Martin et al. (2007), de
Jong et al. (2012), and Meznar and Nigh (1995) observe that firms that are heavily
dependent on the government are more favourably disposed to engage in political
activity.
Faced with corruptible officials controlling obligatory passage points25
through which desired resources flow,26 many SMEs have to make a choice:
18 Peng et al. (2008); de Jong et al. (2012).
19 Peng and Zhou (2005); Yiu and Lau (2008).
20 Peng (2004).
21 Batjargal (2006); Wu and Huang (2008); Lovell et al. (2000); de Jong et al. (2012).
22 Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006).
23 Pfeffer and Salancik (2003)
24 Puffer et al. (2009); Alvarez and Barney (2007); Park and Luo (2001).
25 Clegg (1989).
26 Medcof (2001).
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Either they take unethical actions to secure resource support from officials for the
firm’s survival or they assume no proactive action on obtaining needed resources
and risk going out of business. The firm’s need for survival frames their motivation
for dealing unethically with officials by bribing them. Bribery occurs when serving
officials seek to obtain personal economic benefits by manipulating the institu-
tional environment in favor of a client organization. Themost commonly used def-
inition of bribery, offered by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development in 2000, is “offering, promising, or giving something in order to influ-
ence a public official in the execution of his/her official duties.” Previous research
on bribery has focused on the behavior of individual firms in the context of devel-
oped economies.27 However, in the weak institutional environments of transition
economies, bribery is much more characteristic of a collective behavior.28 With an
economic-social-behavioral model, Ryvkin and Serra (2012) demonstrate that in
emerging economies, the greater the proportion of people who are corrupt, the
less likely it is that specific corrupt or bribed individuals will be detected and
receive sanction.
Although there are findings of firm bribery and political ties in many previous
studies, earlier research has typically been based on a mix of large and small firms
or of various types of economies, as in the data of theWorld Business Environment
Survey (WBES).29 Some data come only from large firms.30 Therefore, they do not
accurately reflect the institutional conditions facing transition SMEs that enter into
dependent relationships with officials in pursuit of resource acquisition through
bribery. A brief summary of previous studies of firm bribery and political ties is pre-
sented in table 1.
Multiple political factors induce SMEs in transition economies to use bribery
to establish political ties for access to essential resources. First, unlike large firms
that governments require officials to support politically and institutionally, SMEs
are often subject to open as well as more subtle political discrimination by offi-
cials.31 Second, unlike large firms, which government policies prioritize in terms
of critical resources, SMEs are placed significantly lower on the priority spec-
trum.32 Third, unlike large firms, whose attributes of high social and political
status allow them to easily attract official support,33 which can become a source
27 Calderón et al. (2009); Martin et al. (2007).
28 Chandler and Graham (2010); Li and Zhang (2007); Gao (2011).
29 See, for example, Gao (2011); Huang and Rice (2012); Zhou et al. (2013); Martin et al. (2007);
Tian (2008).
30 Yiu and Lau (2008).
31 Batjargal (2006); Lovell et al. (2000); de Jong et al. (2012).
32 de Jong et al. (2012).
33 Yiu et al. (2008).
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Table 1: Previous studies of firm bribery and political ties
Sample and findings Implications for bribery and political ties
Peng and Luo (2000) Managers’micro interpersonal ties with top executives at other
firms and government officials’ helps to improve macro
organizational performance. The size of firm has a positive
impact on the firm’s ties in a transition economy. The survey
data were drawn from firms of various sizes in China.
The paper significantly justifies the critical role of political and
business ties at the firm level in transition economies. The
analysis is based on all types of firm sizes but provides no
explanation of how SMEs forge ties with government
officials for benefit and what is actually exchanged.
Martin et al. (2007) The extended anomie theory shows how firm-level pressures
can encourage bribes as a firm strategy. Political and
financial constraints are positively related to local firm
bribery initiatives. The sample consisted primarily of local
SMEs from 80 countries, using the data of the World
Business Environment Survey (WBES).
The paper provides insight into the organizational, cultural,
and institutional drivers of bribery in local firms in their
home countries. The study does not reflect on SMEs’
motivations for bribery in transition economies.
Chen et al. (2008) |Using 2,018 observations from 55 countries and WBES data
collected between 2002 and 2006, it was established that
firms in contexts where public officials have extensive
control are more likely to pay bribes to these officials. Larger
firms are also more likely to pay bribes.
Given the comparative data involving a broad variety of
cultures and various types of economies as well as the mix
of large and small firm sizes, these findings do not directly
reflect characteristics of SMEs’ use of bribery in transition
economies.
Yiu and Lau (2008) Political ties are positively related to firm performance, which
is mediated by various activities of corporate
entrepreneurship. The sample included firms from all types
of ownership: State-owned enterprises, shareholding
enterprises, private firms, and joint ventures.
The paper significantly justifies the critical role of political ties
for firm performance at the firm level in transition
economies. The analysis is based on various types of firm
size and ownership. However, there is no specific
explanation of how SMEs forge ties with government
officials and what is actually exchanged.
Tian (2008) A significant and positive factor in how people favourably
perceive business bribery among Chinese managers is the
degree of moral relativism. The data were collected from
228 managerial respondents drawn from 100 enterprises in
mainland China, with a full range of firm sizes represented.
The paper’s contribution to the literature is the finding that in
paying bribes, firms in a transition economy are rational
actors. The limitation is that there was no specific
explanation of SMEs’ use of bribery.
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(Table 1: Continued)
Sample and findings Implications for bribery and political ties
Wu (2009) Small Asian firms have a higher incidence of bribery than do
larger ones, owing to their control by individual owners;
firms controlled by families are more often associated with
bribery than those that are controlled by corporations or
financial institutions. The sample comprised 1,867 firms in
12 Asian countries and used WBES data collected between
2002 and 2006.
Significantly, theoretical implications are that SMEs in Asian
countries represent a different pattern of bribery from that
of large firms. However, the findings are not specific to
transition economies.
Huang and Rice
(2012)
Firms engaged in increased networking and openness are
more liable to be involved in bribery and corruption owing to
the misuse of guanxi-based networks. The sample
comprised 2,400 Chinese firms in 18 cities in China, spread
across a full range of firm sizes.
The study contributes to the understanding of that the misuse
of networks leads to bribery. The findings of the study may
be valid only in addressing a general attribute of large firms
with little specific discussion of how SMEs engage in
bribery.
Gao (2011) A context of government intervention frames firms’ perceptions
of the benefit of bribery. The sample comprised 132
respondents consisting of business graduates (EMBA and
MBA) from three cities in China.
The study provides the evidence that bribery occurs in a
transition economy. No differentiation is made between
SMEs’ institutional conditions and those of large firms, so
potentially different motivations and activity patterns for
engaging in bribery are not considered.
de Jong et al. (2012) Firm bribery has diminishing returns on the entrepreneurial
performance of Vietnamese SMEs. The propensity to bribe
relates to firm age, size, ownership, and the entrepreneurs’
educational level. The sample comprised entrepreneurs
from 606 SMEs in Vietnam, a transition economy.
The study provides insight into and evidence concerning
SMEs’ use of bribery and its effects on entrepreneurial
revenues in a transition economy. But it does not explain
the institutional reasons why SMEs in a transition economy
engage in bribery.
Zhou et al. (2013) Resource conditions motivate firms to bribe proactively while
institutional conditions induce them to bribe passively. The
sample comprised a mix of Chinese large and small firms
and used WBES data collected between 2002 and 2006.
The explanation of firms’ motivation for bribery in transition
economies uses RDT and anomie theory. However, the
findings do not directly reflect the characteristics of SMEs’
use of bribery in transition economies.
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of particular officials’ personal political gain, SMEs do not ordinarily attract much
attention from government disciplinary agencies and law enforcement authori-
ties.34 They also have lower credibility in the market. Fourth, large firms usually
have robust financial resources or multidimensional business ventures that
allow for long-term survival even if their operations are disrupted by the shortage
of certain critical resources and weaker bargaining power with officials.35 Because
SMEs’ survival in the market is much more precarious, they are likely to have
higher propensity and motivation to bribe officials for access to resources for sur-
vival and growth in such an environment—not because they are more corrupt so
much as because they are more vulnerable to external exigencies.36 Socially and
psychologically, SMEs use bribery of public officials as a way to diminish power
imbalances and build political ties in their quest for resource acquisition. We
thus hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: In transition economies where governments control critical resources,
SMEs’ PID is positively related to the firms’ use of bribery to induce officials’ support.
Induced bribery as an instrumental choice for resource
acquisition
In transition economies, firms’ use of political ties to access financial, reputational,
and legal resources is well established in the literature,37 but the question of how it
is practiced by SMEs in the context of power imbalance has been given scant
attention.38
Theoretically, RDT suggests that resource power disequilibria can easily lead
to incommensurate, inadequate, and unfair exchanges for the disadvantaged side;
that a relationally less powerful actor is less likely to achieve reciprocity with the
dominant side;39 and that organizations characterized by a high degree of depen-
dence on others are more likely to be proactive in seeking to absorb the sources of
their dependence.40 To reduce PID in securing the flow of valued resources,
34 Wu and Huang (2008); Svensson (2003).
35 de Jong et al. (2012).
36 Wu (2009).
37 See, for example, Batjargal (2006); Lovell et al. (2000); de Jong et al. (2012); Peng and Luo
(2000); Wang et al. (2013); Zhou (2013).
38 de Jong et al. (2012); Warren et al. (2004); Huang and Rice (2012).
39 Casciaro and Piskorski (2005); Newbert and Tornikoski (2013).
40 Pfeffer and Salancik (2003).
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dependant organizations tend to restructure their dependencies through various
tactics. Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) suggest that these tactics can include social-
izing with members of the constraining organization or exchanging valuable
goods, such as status, friendship, or information.
Given economies in which the government plays a central and pervasive role,
cultivating ties with officials can be instrumental in overcoming institutional bar-
riers to resource acquisition.41 Specifically, when officials control key conduits for
access to business resources, they can offer firms a variety of privileges, such as
highly profitable projects, tax waiver approvals, exclusive licensing, access to
advanced technologies, and the allocation of scarce resources such as bank
loans.42 Following the logic of RDT, it can be further reasoned that in transition
economies, in the context of a high degree of power imbalance and no market-
based exchange of resources, SMEs tend to adopt proactive tactics for gaining
the flow of valued resources, but the tactics of exchanging friendship or status to
restructure a power balance may not be sufficient for SMEs to gain critical
resources from governments. Choices of their tactics have to be open to influence
by corrupt officials who are able to abuse their authority unilaterally. Their obser-
vation of officials’ support preference leads them to believe that meeting officials’
personal need is a sufficient tactic for this purpose.
During the process of establishing political ties, SMEs as resource seekers and
donors base their exchanges on the expectation that, in return for inducements,
officials will be willing to help overcome structural constraints to make decisions
that favour SMEs.43 Ties based on PID typically operate under the expectation of
immediate reciprocal returns to the bribing party.44 Officials in transition econo-
mies, as rent seekers, are open to inducement from a plurality of firms.45 In reality,
however, they can only provide exclusive resources to a small number of firms. In
this context, they will be reluctant to commit to any particular relationship if
opportunities exist for more lucrative returns.46 Corrupt officials will select those
exchanges that they perceive will deliver the greatest personal benefits.
Larger corporations in either the state or private sector are more likely to enjoy
formal political favor and have a PMD on government control. SMEs with much
weaker political status are often unable to establish political ties for access to
essential resources unless they choose to bribe officials as power restructuring
41 Peng (2004); Park and Luo (2001); Wang et al. (2013).
42 Wang et al. (2013).
43 Wang (2007).
44 Casciaro and Piskorski (2005); Newbert and Tornikoski (2013).
45 Wang et al. (2003); Wu and Huang (2008); Puffer et al. (2009); Tonoyan et al. (2010).
46 Molm et al. (2000); Sun et al. (2012).
10 Karen Yuan Wang and Stewart Clegg
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2017.31
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Access paid by the UC Berkeley Library, on 31 Oct 2017 at 22:17:50, subject to the
tactics to increase opportunities.47 For these SMEs, being unethical with respect to
officials is a choice involving the calculation of future costs and benefits.48 We thus
hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Induced bribery that meets the personal needs of officials with whom
political ties are established is positively associated with resource acquisition by
SMEs in transition economies.
Moderating effect of power-mutual dependence
Winning business opportunities by meeting the personal needs of corrupt officials
to forge political ties is a double-edged sword for SMEs as it channels entrepre-
neurship into unhealthy dependent relations. For SMEs, not only is it potentially
destructive to entrepreneurial creativity and animal spirits,49 but also it leads to the
risk of being charged with criminal conduct and associated with substantial finan-
cial loss and personal psychological suffering. To minimize political risk and
potential loss, SMEs need to decrease their PID.50 We next examine the strategies
that SMEs take to mitigate risk when dealing with imbalanced dependency for
resource acquisition. They resort to business ties to create PMD and lower PID
on officials. Business ties refer to informal social connections with buyers, suppli-
ers, other market collaborators, influential people and top managers from various
industries, as well as acquaintances and friends.51 These social connections are
embedded in networks that are possible conduits for accessing various resources
such as knowledge, resources, and complementary capabilities.52
While exploring the role of both political ties and business ties in firm perfor-
mance, previous research has underplayed the interactive effect between two
types of ties that firms use on powerful governments in emerging economies,53
RDT suggests that an organization’s critical ability to reduce imbalanced depen-
dence is related to its capacity to create mutually beneficial exchanges. Mutual
47 Michener (2004); Chen et al. (2008).
48 Gao (2011); Wang (2007).
49 Baumol (1990); Puffer et al. (2009).
50 Newbert and Tornikoski (2013).
51 Peng and Luo (2000); Wang et al. (2013); Burt (2005).
52 Burt (2005).
53 Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012).
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dependence captures the existence of bilateral dependence in a dyad.54 PMD
refers to a situation where the average level of dependence of both parties is rela-
tively equal and bilateral.55
Power imbalance and mutual dependence need to be considered simultane-
ously in the power-dependence structure by organizations when trying to control
their external dependency. A PID can be varied by levels of mutual dependence
within its own dyad from time to time with a dynamic interaction for any
value.56 Building on Casciaro and Piskorski’s (2005) findings, we argue that the
extent that external dependency varies corresponds to the degree of mutual
dependency embedded in coalition relations. On the basis of a survey of 241
Chinese firms, Sheng et al. (2013) found that business ties are more beneficial
when legal enforcement is inefficient and technology is changing rapidly,
whereas political ties lead to increased performance when general government
support is weak and technological turbulence is low.
One strategy of PMD to alleviate firm imbalanced dependence involves
forming coalitions with other differently resourced agents seeking various
resources through business ties. Coalitions provide SMEs with opportunities to
generate bridging ties and cultivate mutual exchanges with diverse resource sup-
pliers.57 Social capital theory suggests that the sets of dyadic ties thatmake up busi-
ness networks are characterized by reciprocity, trustworthiness, and shared vision
among the parties.58 Such interlocking directorates provide firms with credible
business information for strategic actions as well as interfirm resource exchange,59
particularly when other sources of information and resources are not available.60
The accessible resources are embedded in these business networks through
reciprocity.61
In power-mutual business networks, when the parties feel a sense of obliga-
tion toward one another and demonstrate active engagement through various
cross-industry links, reciprocal behavior with a long-term perspective on relation-
ships is likely to occur.62 Reciprocity is manifest in exchanges that share technol-
ogies, innovative applications, and common production resources; in sharing
distributive channels; and by making both short-term and longer-term
54 Casciaro and Piskorski (2005); Greve and Salaff (2003).
55 Casciaro and Piskorski (2005).
56 Ibid.
57 Street and Cameron (2007); Huang and Wang (2013).
58 Tsai and Ghoshal (1998).
59 Ibid.
60 Yiu and Lau (2008).
61 Lin (1999).
62 Wang et al. (2012).
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opportunities to collaborate on significant projects that require contributions
across various industries.
Coalitions embedded in networks allow firms to procure assets, competencies,
or capabilities that are not readily available in competitive factormarkets, as well as
to tap into history-dependent competencies and resources that are difficult to
trade in strategic factor markets.63 Characterized by the reliability of assets and a
history of exchange that enables identification of trustworthy partners, power-
mutual relationships reduce uncertainty regarding the flow of necessary resources,
neutralizing dependence by relying on social norms of cooperation and reciproc-
ity.64 Structurally, business ties embedded in networks are grounded in social
attachments;65 they expedite firm resource acquisition because the network rela-
tionship is based on mutual dependence, providing firms with opportunities to
invoke the norm of reciprocity among supplies within coalitions.66
A number of studies relate advantages derived from power-mutual-based
business ties to resource acquisition and growth generally. Chisholm and
Nelson (2009), for example, find that relationships with customers, suppliers,
and external organizations such as universities, banks, and venture capitalists facil-
itate the achievement of ends that would otherwise not be attainable at lower cost.
Successful entrepreneurs use social contacts to obtain resources for start-ups.
Venture capital organizations help entrepreneurs by using their contacts and net-
works to provide access to important sources.67 The quality of the relationship
between a small business and its bank influences the costs of borrowing.68
Building upon family embeddedness, Arregle et al. (2015) tested the curvilinear
relationship between the proportion of family ties in entrepreneurs’ networks
and venture growth on entrepreneurs from China, France, Russia, and the
United States and found a U-shape for the business resource network in this
relationship.
Compared with bribery, the reciprocity of PMD embedded in networks is less
immediate but more oriented toward mutual commitment. The risk of opportun-
ism on the part of corrupt officials is reduced. Seeking to develop mutually recip-
rocal obligations to gain resources from diverse sources and reduce reliance on
political ties is a preferred strategy under systems based on strongly institutional-
ized legitimacy. In institutional environments characterized by less government
63 Oliver (1997); Yiu and Lau (2008).
64 Casciaro and Piskorski (2005).
65 Granovetter (1992); Burt (2005); Moran (2005).
66 Luo (2003; 2008).
67 Freeman (1999).
68 Uzzi (1999).
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control and in which firms can effectively search for, access, and acquire desired
resources via power-balanced reciprocity, however, firms rely less on officials to
acquire external resources. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3: SMEs’ PMD negatively moderates the relationship between induced
bribery and resource acquisition. Specifically, for SMEs, the more a firm resorts to
PMD, the less it will turn to bribery to gain resources.
Methods
Sampling and procedure
We selected China, the largest transition economy, as the location for this study.
Peng et al. (2008) argue that in transition economies, as state control morphs into
market-based economies, a degree of institutional convergence occurs. Hence,
China, while certainly an outlier in terms of state control and the size of its
economy, reflects wider trends in transition.
Our sample comprised entrepreneurs who operated businesses and were
responsible for the strategic and administrative activities of their firms. As such,
they would have oversight over any activities related to the firm’s political and
business ties. The sample was drawn from the population of local company regis-
tration databases in the city administrations of industry and commerce in cities in
Sichuan province. To ensure sampling representativeness, we constructed a rep-
resentative random selection.69 De Jong et al.’s (2012) study suggests that partic-
ular entrepreneurial firm and industry-specific characteristics affect the likelihood
Figure 1. The framework for power dependence, induced bribery, and resource acquisition for
SMEs in transitional economies
69 Kruskal and Mosteller (1979).
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of bribes. We randomly selected firms drawn from the lists of industry sectors
dependent on specific resources, such as licensing and land, or that encountered
a high demand for competitive resources. The selected industry sectors were retail,
real estate, travel, telecommunication services, and manufacturing—sectors offi-
cially identified as having high rates of bribery and corruption.70 The average
firm size was 160 employees, which fits a definition of SMEs in China according
to Cunningham’s (2011) study, and the average firm age was 8.4 years. The
average entrepreneur tenure at the firm was approximately ten years.
Research assistants, being hired to distribute and collect 280 questionnaires,
visited entrepreneurs in person to ensure that the questionnaires were completed.
The investigation yielded a sample of useful questionnaires from 232 respondents
(191 men and 41 women). The remaining forty-eight questionnaires were either
incomplete or completed with the similar scale choices on most items throughout
the questionnaire. The response rate of 83 percent was high, reflecting the efficacy
of the face-to-face method of data collection.
Analysis and validity
We performed four steps to ensure the validity of the investigation and statistical
analysis. First, we developed the survey instrument on the basis of published
empirical and conceptual studies. Since all questionnaire items were derived
from English-language studies, we translated them into Chinese. The Mandarin
and English versions were verified for equivalency in meaning and refined
through backward-forward translation to ensure face and content validity.
Second, we conducted a pilot study consisting of a questionnaire and subsequent
interviews with seven participants. The questionnaire was then modified accord-
ingly. Third, to avoid the effect of social desirability bias and fears, especially with
respect to measures in relation to bribery, we took critical steps to guarantee (1)
anonymity in completing the questionnaires, ensuring neutrality and limiting
the respondents’ personal involvement in the answers; (2) the neutral phrasing
of the sensitive questions—for example, use of the phrase “a firm” instead of
“our firm” to avoid concern in admitting misconduct; and (3) the focus of sensitive
questions on the respondents’ firms rather than on the respondents themselves.71
Finally, before testing the hypothesized paths in the theoretical model (see
figure 1) using SPSS version 23, we employed exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to ensure both internal convergent validity
within each construct and concurrent validity and discriminant validity between
70 Xinhua News Agency (2005).
71 Thompson and Phua (2005).
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constructs. Specifically, we examined nineteen survey items using an unrotated
principal components factor analytic procedure. No single predominant factor
emerged. Instead, the analysis generated five factors with eigenvalues larger
than 1. The maximum variance was 23.75 percent, and the cumulative variance
explained by these five extracted factors was 62.05 percent. Results of the EFA anal-
ysis show that no dominant single factor accounted for the majority of covariance
in the variables. Then, to obtain a more precise assessment of common method
variance in the data, we used a CFA approach to test for such bias. The model
proved a better fit (with chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio of 2.725, GFI¼
0.911, RMSEA¼ .06, and CFI¼ 0.918) after four items were removed. These
items were “a firm had tomake extra payment to officials connected with awarding
of benefits”; “a firm had to pay a facilitating fee to officials for favourable judicial
decisions”; “our firm’s operation relies on support by officials who influence crit-
ical decisions on resources allocation”; and “our firm has obtained legal help and
regulatory information in the past three years.”
Factor loadings with fifteen items in the survey questionnaire and scale reli-
abilities for these variables confirmed measurement validity as reported in
table 2. The alpha values of the scales were more than 0.70. Collectively, these
results show that common-method bias was not an issue in the study. We also
assessed convergent validity by examining the average variance extracted (AVE)
values. Table 2 also shows that all the AVE values are well above the recommended
threshold level of 50 percent.
Measures
All measures were assessed by asking the subjects to rate their level of agreement
with a given statement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 for “strongly dis-
agree” to 5 for “strongly agree.” The operationalmeasures of variables, reliability of
each scale (Cronbach’s alpha), and factor loadings are reported in table 1.
Independent variables
Power-imbalanced dependence (PID) is measured by a four-item scale and devel-
oped from both the literature of RDT, especially Casciaro and Piskorski (2005), and
the instrument of political ties (Peng and Luo 2000) tomeasure the extent to which
a firm’s operations depend on the officials who control or influence resource
allocation.
Induced bribery measures the extent to which a firm believes it has to deal with
corrupt officials using three items adapted and modified from the Corruption
16 Karen Yuan Wang and Stewart Clegg
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Table 2: Operational measures, reliability, factor loadings and AVE
ID
Measurement item in the survey questionnaire
and scale reliability
Factor
loading
AVE
(%)
1. Power-imbalanced dependency (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.89)
PID1 Our firm operation is highly dependent on support from
officials in our area who influence critical decisions
regarding how resources are allocated.
0.811 71.28
PID2 Our firm’s business relies on the support of officials in
various levels of the government.
0.810
PID3 Our firm relies on the support of officials in regulatory and
supporting organizations, such as tax bureaus, state
banks, commercial administration bureaus.
0.803
PID4 Our firm relies on various sources influenced by government
for needed resources rather than solely relying on the
normal channels of our industry.
0.573
2. Induced bribery (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.79)
IB1 A firm had to pay a facilitating fee to officials to gain
favourable outcomes
0.697 59.12
IB2 A firm had to meet officials’ personal needs for awarding
benefits it seeks
0.645
IB3 A firm had to meet officials’ personal needs for awarding
resources it seeks
0.521
3. Power-mutual dependence (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.78)
PMD1 Our firm is able to stabilize the flow of resources provided by
other firms of various industries through consensus in
benefit exchange.
0.879 69.23
PMD2 Our firm is able to gain resources by resolving disputes with
other firms of various industries on benefit exchanges
through negotiation.
0.861
PMD3 Our firm is able to gain resources by reaching fairness and
equality concerning mutual exchanges with other firms of
various industries.
0.686
4. Perceived unethicality (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.92)
PU1 The payment of money for the personal needs to gain firm
resources is unethical.
0.92 75.31
PU2 It is morally wrong to pay the money to gain our firm’s
resources.
0.89
5. Resource acquisition (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.786)
RA1 Our firm has obtained production and technology resources
in the past three years.
0.832 62.38
RA2 Our firm has obtained financial resources in the past three
years.
0.758
RAs Our firm has obtained licensing resources for lands and
projects in the past three years.
0.652
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Perception Index (CPI 2005), one of the most visible and systematic measures of
perceived bribe taking in the world.
Power-mutual dependence (PMD), developed fromCasciaro and Piskorski’s (2005)
theoretical analysis, uses a three-item scale to measure the extent to which a firm’s
resource acquisition depends on fair exchanges of resources with other firms from
various industries.
Dependent variable
Resource acquisition measures the extent to which a firm obtained business
resources. This three-item scale was based on Mahoney’s (1995) analysis of
resource learning theory, which defines resources in an inclusivemanner and clas-
sifies them in terms of tangible, intangible, and useful types.
Control variables
In the analysis, we controlled for firm size, as previous research has suggested that
a firm’s size is negatively related to the firm’s need for social ties to ensure survival
and prosperity.72 When predatory officials demand personal inducements to
provide services to small firms, the firms are in a weaker position to resist than
are larger firms.73 We also controlled for firm age and respondents’ number of
years of employment at the firm74 and industry because it often takes time for
SMEs to observe the effect of networking and bribery on their businesses within
the context of the industry.
Additionally, we controlled for entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the unethical
nature of bribery. Perceived unethicality was adopted and modified from
Powpaka’s (2002) study and used a two-item scale to measure the extent to
which managers perceive paying a facilitating fee to be unethical. In most
countries, bribery is against the law, even if widely practiced and reinforced by
gift-appreciative cultural and historical factors, as is the case in many transition
economies such as China, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Poland, and Russia.75
The degree to which it is regarded as unethical varies.76 The theory of planned
behavior suggests that perceived behavioral control directly influences behavioral
intentions and that such perceived behavioral control, together with behavioral
72 Peng and Luo (2000); Yeung and Tung (1996).
73 de Jong et al. (2012); Wu (2009); Zhou (2013).
74 de Jong et al. (2012).
75 Tian (2008); Wang et al. (2003).
76 Dunfee, et al. (1999).
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intention, can be used directly to predict behavioral achievement of individuals.77
According to this theory, an entrepreneur’s intention to use bribes for business sur-
vival will be influenced by that person’s attitude toward bribery. In considering
whether to engage in certain behavior, people have to deal with the social pres-
sures they experience. In this case, an SME entrepreneur’s belief that significant
others think that bribery is wrong may also be influential.
Results
The means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for all variables are
reported in table 3. The zero-order correlations indicate significant correlations
between the variables.
To examine the effect of PID on induced bribery and the effect of induced
bribery on firm resource acquisition, we conducted a regression analysis (table
4). On the basis of our examination of the effects of the control variables on
these variables (model 1), we regressed PID on induced bribery (Step 1). Results
in model 2a show that PID is positively related to induced bribery. We then
regressed the variable of induced bribery on resource acquisition (Step 2).
Results in model 2b suggest that induced bribery has a significant positive effect
on resource acquisition. Our data support hypothesis 1, stating that in transition
economies where governments control critical resources, SMEs’ PID is positively
related to bribery to induce officials’ support, and hypothesis 2, stating that
induced bribery that meets the personal needs of officials with whom political
ties are established is associated with resource acquisition by SMEs in transition
economies.
To test the hypotheses of the interaction terms composed of PMD, we
employed a moderated hierarchical regression analysis (Step 3). To minimize
the potential threat of multicollinearity, we mean-centred all independent vari-
ables constituting interaction terms and then created the interaction terms bymul-
tiplying the relevant mean-centred variables. Model 3b indicates that PMD of
business ties is positively and significantly related to resource acquisition. In
model 4b, the interaction between induced bribery and power-balanced reciproc-
ity produces a negative relationship with resource acquisition. These findings
reflect the significant moderating effect of PMD of business ties on the bribery-
resource acquisition relationship. Thus, hypothesis 3, stating that SMEs’ PMD
negatively moderates the relationship between induced bribery and resource
acquisition, is supported.
77 Ajzen and Fishbein (1980); Ajzen (1991).
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Table 3: Means, standard deviations, and Pearson Correlationsa for variables (N¼ 232)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Firm year 8.4 13.35 –
2. Firm sizeb 3.65 1.16 .38** –
3. Working years in firmc 3.00 1.43 .64** .38** –
4. Industry sector dummy 0.58 .050 .07 .08 .01 –
5. Perceived unethicality 4.01 .75 .08 .15 .28** .01 –
6. Imbalanced dependency 2.00 .93 .06 .11 .10 .11 23** –
7. Induced bribery 3.21 .92 .16* .22** 26** .16* 22* .30** –
8. Mutual dependency 4.29 .68 .03 .07 .07 .06 .42** .34** .13 –
9. Resource acquisition 4.00 .84 .04 .06 .11 .09 .25** .18* .19* .23** –
a * p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p< 0.01 (2-tailed). b Firm size was coded as 1¼ 1–10; 2¼ 11–30; 3¼ 31–100; 4¼ 101–200; 5¼more than 200; 6¼more
than 1,000; cWorking years in firm was coded as 1¼ less than 2 years; 2¼ 2–5 years; 3¼ 6–10 years; 4¼ 11–20 years, and 5¼more than 20 years.
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Table 4: Regression for power-imbalanced dependence, induced bribery, and resource acquisition of SMEs in transition economies
Induced bribery Resource acquisition
Variables Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b
Firm size .13* .06 .14* .02 .06** .09**
Firm years .16*** .19*** .17*** .18*** .20*** .21**
Working years in firm .05 04 .05 .04 .07 .08
Industry sector dummy 0.8 .10 .0.6 .08 .05 .02
Perceived unethicality .17* .20* .14 .15* 17** 19**
Power-imbalanced dependence (PID) .21*** .15* .17* .16* 20*
Induced bribery (IB) .20** .22** 25**
Power-mutual dependence (PMD) .27*** 30***
Moderating interaction
IB×PMD .16**
R square .20 .26 .23 .27 .31
Adjusted R square .11 .19 .21 .24 .30
F value 3.05** 3.71*** 2.80*** 3.01*** 3.12***
N¼ 223;þ p < .1; * p< .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001.
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Discussion
Although academic interest in bribery andmanagerial ties in transition economies
has been evident for more than a decade,78 the issue of how these factors are actu-
ally developed in relation to SMEs’ resource acquisition in transformational econ-
omies has not been adequately investigated and explained. Our study examines
the influence of resource dependency on bribery and PMD in transition economies
and contributes to the literature and practice in several ways.
Theoretical implications
The result of the ongoing debate regarding the relationships among poor gover-
nance, managerial ties, and firm bribery is inconclusive.79 Prior studies have gen-
erally captured the positive value of political ties on firm performance rather than
the negative effects of PID caused by institutional constraints in transition econo-
mies.80 They either avoid or ignore the negative effects of bribery associated with
political ties on SMEs’ constructive entrepreneurship—as well as on society—in
the process of establishing political ties.
First, our study contributes to the literature on SMEs by incorporating RDT to
address fundamental issues of resource acquisition. Our results suggest a propen-
sity for SMEs in transition economies to engage in bribery to establish political ties
in conditions of considerable power imbalance. Conceptually and empirically, we
find that SMEs use bribery to proactively create a relatively “favorable” external
environment to ensure resources for survival when their level of PID on govern-
ment control is high.
Second, our findings challenge the conventional tendency in transition
economy studies to simply attribute bribery to the immoral behavior of individual
entrepreneurs or to a passive response to extortion by individual public officials.81
Instead, we contend that induced bribery by SMEs is a collectively unethical
response to economic and political constraints occurring in institutionalized envi-
ronments where resource imbalances are significant and legitimate ethics are
weakly framed. Our study makes a significant contribution to an understanding
of the causes of unethical behavior by using the RDT perspective to analyse root
causes of SMEs’ involvement in bribery in transition economies.
78 Peng and Luo (2000); Hamra (2000); de Jong et al. (2012),
79 Calderón et al. (2009).
80 See, for example, Peng and Luo (2000); Yiu and Lau (2008); Sun et al. (2012); Wang et al.
(2013).
81 Spence et al. (2000).
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Third, our study extends previous studies ofmanagerial ties in transition econ-
omies by differentiating between power-imbalanced dependency of political ties
and mutual-balance dependency of business ties in relation to resource acquisi-
tion of SMEs. Our findings indicate that when SMEs proactively endeavour to
increase PMD in unfavourable institutional environments, there will be less
resource acquisition through PID on officials. We contend that the two types of
power dependence are not mutually exclusive in terms of overcoming constraints
on resource acquisition. SMEs should seek to develop mutually reciprocal obliga-
tions to gain resources from diverse business sources and reduce reliance on polit-
ical ties.
Practice implications
Puffer et al. (2009) observe that in Russia, SMEs’ attempts to use official channels
and procedures to obtain resources often result in frustration and failure. The sit-
uation seems similar in China. In practice, bribery is destructive for entrepreneur-
ship because it solidifies power imbalances. Characterized by diminishing returns
in relation to entrepreneurial performance as a whole,82 bribery ultimately results
in a profoundly dysfunctional and demoralizing experience for many firms. As
SMEs’ behaviour in relation to bribery reflects their current political status in insti-
tutional environments, our analysis suggests that there is an urgent need to
improve the institutional environment in these economies. Although bribery
may be perceived as a rational choice by SMEs intent on firm survival, it is only
a temporary means to cope with institutional constraints.
Perceived power disequilibria in exchanges with corrupted officials can be
offset by SMEs exploring diverse resources via business ties embedded in hetero-
geneous networks. Such business ties have a much lower risk of criminality, cost
less, and, most importantly, offer the prospect of long-term returns. The statisti-
cally significant link between business ties and SMEs’ acquisition of business
resources in our analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach.
However, our study also suggests that to minimise bribery among SMEs in transi-
tion economies, a critical step would involve reducing governments’ power to
control resources. When mechanisms exist for establishing, maintaining, and (in
cases of breaches) reproducing high institutional trust, bribery can be partially
contained through improved corporate governance.83 Our findings imply that
SMEs’ institutional dependence on bribery will decrease in transition economies
through the emergence of what Weber (1978) defines as a rational state staffed by
82 See, for example, de Jong et al. (2012); Nguyen and Cragg (2012).
83 Calderón et al. (2009).
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officers with a professional ethos operating in a formal legal-rational institutional
environment.
Limitations and future research
Our research represents one of the few empirical studies that explore and test the
linkages among key variables of firm resource dependency, bribery, and power-
balanced reciprocity of managerial ties. Nonetheless, the limitations of this
study provide opportunities for further research. First, we did not include contex-
tual factors of firm dependence and political ties, such as trustworthiness and
deception, although previous studies have recognized these factors as affecting
exchange relations.84 Future research would benefit from an examination of
these relationships to provide a more comprehensive understanding.
Second, the specific characteristics of SME management could affect the out-
comes of relationships of organizational power balance with the external environ-
ments, as suggested by RDT.85 Accordingly, it would be especially interesting for
future research to investigate the influence of network density on firms’ adoption
of bribery and power-balanced reciprocity in heterogeneous networks.
Third, the issue of whether bribery benefits firms’ long-term growth has been a
topic of research attention for decades, not only from the perspective of interna-
tional business and business ethics but also from that of sociology and economics;
nonetheless, the evidence remains inconclusive. From an economic perspective,
for example, Olken and Panda (2012) use the data from Indonesia and India, and
Svensson (2005) uses data fromUganda, to propose that bribery has a negative cor-
relation with a firm’s long-term growth in developing countries. Svensson (2005,
40), however, has asked if “China has been able to grow fast while being ranked
among the most corrupt countries. Is corruption less harmful in China? Or
would China have grown even faster if corruption was lower?”Meanwhile, schol-
ars of a social capital orientation conclude that, in general, political ties do facilitate
firms’ performance in transition economies in distinctly different ways from those
in other developing countries in terms of institutions, cultures, and political
systems. While our study takes an important step in contributing to the literature
through its findings of a positive relationship between bribery and resource acqui-
sition in transition economies, future research may explore this issue further by
investigating whether in these economies bribery is linked with SMEs’ long-term
growth via the mediation of resources acquisition.
84 Wang et al. (2012).
85 Provan and Gassenheimer (1994).
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Fourth, our study used heretical regression analysis as amethod to analyse the
data, a form of analysis that is used for prediction and forecasting which indepen-
dent variables are related to the dependent variable but not for testing a linear
cause-effect relationship. The findings of our study, therefore, cannot be inferred
as causal relationships. Generalization of its conclusion should be subject to this
caution. Future research may expand the analysis to linear cause-effect relation-
ships to increase generalization.
Conclusion
Our study offers a better understanding of survival and growth behaviors among
SMEs in transition economies in the context of their increasingly significant role in
global business. Despite its unethical nature, bribery is an approach that SMEs use
to cope with institutional constraints on obtaining resources. The study contrib-
utes to the literature on SME development by analysing the critical phenomena
of resource acquisition from the perspective of power balances within weak insti-
tutional environments. To prevent bribery by SMEs, legitimate networking should
be encouraged and the void created by insufficient formal legal-rational institu-
tions minimised. Given that this situation is effectively a case of “physician, heal
thyself,” we recognize a degree of irony. Only in situations with competitive and
countervailing plural political elites would one expect reform to occur; otherwise,
oligopoly tends to reproduce the conditions under which unethical behaviour
occurs.
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